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Current Developments
United Nations Affairs
"Friendly Relations" in the United Nations
ROBERT STARR*

This is a further report on the 1966-67 activities of the United
Nations relating to the "progressive development and codification"
of "the principles of international law concerning friendly relations
and cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter." 1
The origins of the "friendly relations" exercise are well known.2
The initiative lay with the Soviet bloc countries, which sought in
effect to reshape the Charter to conform to their ideological concept
of "peaceful coexistence." They saw the propaganda potential of
such an exercise, and could not fail to seek to exploit the impatience
and dissatisfaction of developing countries to whom the process of
codification and progressive development of international law meant,
above all, its creative reshaping and rewriting to meet the vastly
changed conditions in international society. The West could expect,
therefore, that the Soviet bloc and developing countries would find
* J.D., M. Comp. L., University of Chicago; Docteur en Droit, University of
Aix-Marseille (France). The writer was a member of the U.S. delegation to
the 1967 U.N. Special Committee on Friendly Relations and to the 22nd
session of the U.N. General Assembly. The views expressed herein are the
sole responsibility of the writer and do not necessarily represent the position
of any agency of the U.S. Government.
I See an earlier report in 1 International Lawyer 96 (1966) by G. Winthrop
Haight, "Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States."
2 See Haight, op. cit., and Lee, "The Mexico City Conference of the United
Nations Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States," 14 Int'l. & Comp. L.Q.
1296 (1965); McWhinney, "The 'New' Countries and the 'New' International
Law: The United Nations' Special Conference on Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States," 60 A.J.I.L. 1 (1966); and Houben, "Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States," A.J.I.L. 703 (1967).
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common ground in "the political rewriting of international law to
suit the needs of the contemporary world community as they themselves, in their varying ways, might define those needs" '-and notwithstanding the fact that the General Assembly did not approve the
Soviet objective of codifying "peaceful existence," and that Assembly
resolution 1815 provided that the United Nations Charter was the
"fundamental statement" of "the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among States and the duties
deriving therefrom.
The Western response to the Soviet initiative, while positive,
was cautious, and clearly was based upon a different concept of
"progressive development and codification." Senator Gore, speaking
in his capacity as U.S. Representative to the 17th General Assembly,
said that the friendly relations agenda item should be utilized:
to initiate a detailed, substantive study of certain topics of
international law which are at present in need of clarification
and elaboration and whose articulation would be of general
and immediate interest in the establishment
of friendly rela4
tions and cooperation among States.
Western delegations stressed the modest goal of examining the
practice of States and of the United Nations with a view to clarifying
the relevant principles of international law. Given such a position,
it would not be easy for them to project a positive image, to demonstrate that they could develop theories of international law that
would satisfy their own modest objectives and vigorous standards
and also satisfy the 9lan of the developing countries-even though
the Soviet bloc position appeared to contain certain inner contradictions that might be exploited by the West.'
I. Developments Before 1967
The Special Committee on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, com3 McWhinney, supra,n. 2 at 3.
4 Gore, "Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
Among States," 47 Dept. of State Bull. 972-977 (1962).

5Houben rightly noted that, by active participation in such an exercise,
Communist countries are impelled to go beyond the limits imposed, at least in
principle, by their own ideology. Supra n. 2 at 732. However, the practical
significance of this factor is not readily apparent. Moreover, the expectation
has not materialized that, by becoming involved in the process of molding
agreement, Communist countries would be impelled to pay increasing attention
to the progressive development of such principles as peaceful settlement and
cooperation. Ibid. at 736; cf., infra parts B and C.
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posed of representatives of member States, met in Mexico City in
1964 for five weeks and in New York City in 1966 for several weeks.'
The General Assembly considered the report of the 1966 Special
Committee at its 21st session, also in 1966. There was general
agreement that the Special Committee should be asked to meet again
for at least one more session; most of the debate concerned the role
to be played by consensus in the future work of the Special Committee
and the terms of reference under which it would operate. In a
preambular paragraph of resolution 2103, which the General Assembly adopted at its 20th session, after the Mexico City session of the
Special Committee, the Assembly declared that it was "convinced of
the significance of continuing the effort to achieve general agreement
at every stage of the process . . . , without prejudice to the applicable rules of procedure of the General Assembly . . ." (emphasis
added). At its 21st session the Assembly would not go that far:
the parallel preambular paragraph in resolution 2181, adopted at the
21st session, omitted the underscored words quoted above. In Resolution 2181 the Assembly decided to ask the Special Committee as
reconstituted in 1965 to continue its work. First, the Assembly
instructed the Special Committee to complete the formulations of the
principles of nonuse of force, duty to cooperate, equal rights and self
determination of peoples, and good faith fulfillment of obligations.
The Assembly asked the Special Committee to take up non-intervention under special instructions.7
The Special Committee was to take up the five principles mentioned above as a matter of priority, and to consider any additional
proposals with a view to widening the areas of agreement expressed
in the formulations of the 1966 Special Committee on peaceful
settlement of disputes and sovereign equality of states. The Assembly
further requested the Special Committee to submit to the Assembly
6 U.N. Doc. No. A/5746, 16 Nov. 1964 (Report on the Mexico City session
by Hans Blix of Sweden). U.N. Doc. No. A/6230, 27 June 1966 (Report on
the New York session by W. Riphagen of the Netherlands). As reconstituted
by the General Assembly in 1965, the Special Committee consisted of representatives of the following States:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Italy, Japan, Kenya,
Lebanon, Madagascar, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,
Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
7 See infra, p. 537.
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at its 22nd session, in 1967, a comprehensive report and draft declaration on all seven principles.
H..The 1967 Special Committee
The Special Committee held its third session in Geneva during
the Summer of 1967.8 The Geneva session, which lasted five weeks,
resulted in consensus texts 'a on four principles, namely the two on
which agreement had been reached in Mexico City (sovereign equality) and New York (peaceful settlement of disputes), respectively,
and the two on which the Special Committee had been close to
agreement in New York (duty to cooperate and good faith fulfillment of obligations). At Geneva agreement was also reached on
certain points relating to other principles, mainly non-use of force,
and certain areas of disagreement were more clearly defined. Still,
the Special Committee was unable to fulfill its mandate under
General Assembly resolution 2181 to prepare a comprehensive report
and draft declaration on all seven principles for consideration by
the Assembly at its next session.
A. The principle of sovereign equality of States
The 1966 Special Committee adopted a consensus text substantially the same as the points of consensus adopted by the Special
Committee in 1964.' The working group that considered this prins U.N. Doc. A/6799, 26 Sept. 1967 (Report of the Geneva Session by Milan
Sahovic of Yugoslavia, hereinafter referred to as "1967 Report").

8a See infra, p. 520.

The 1966 Special Committee adopted the following text:
"1. All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and
duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other

nature.
"2. In particular, sovereign equality includes the following elements:
"(a) States are juridically equal.
"(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty.
"(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other
States.

"(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the
State are inviolable.
"(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems.
"(f, Each State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith
with its international obligations and to live in peace with other

States."
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ciple at the 1967 session 10 agreed on the desirability of maintaining
the text on which consensus had already been reached, but it was
unable to enlarge upon that text. In the working group there was
agreement in principle, however, on the desirability of including the
concept of the right of every State to dispose freely of its national
wealth and natural resources; " and that the statement of the principle could include a reference to the right of every State to take
part in the solution of international questions affecting its legitimate
interests (proposals to this latter effect were made by Czechoslovakia 12 and Lebanon)." There was also agreement on the possible
acceptance of the concept that no State has the right to conduct any
experiment or resort to any action which is capable of having harmful
effects on other States-if certain modifications were made to the
text proposed by the United Arab Republic."' The drafting committee at the 1966 session came close to achieving consensus on
each of these three controversial issues-so the 1967 Special Committee's working group report of progress in these areas was not
surprising.
The working group also reported that there was no agreement
on a Czech proposal 15 declaring the right of every State to join
international organizations and become a party to multilateral treaties
dealing with or governing matters involving its legitimate interests,
This text differs from the points of consensus adopted in 1964
only in the second sentence of the first paragraph. The 1964 text

had read:
"As subjects of international law they have equal rights and
duties."
10 The report of the working group is contained in U.N. Doc. A/AC.125/
DC.21, which appears in para. 438 of the 1967 Report. All documents of the
1967 session are contained in the 1967 Report and are referred to hereinafter
simply by their "L" or "DC" numbers. Similarly, summary records of the
session are cited "SR" instead of "A/AC. 125/SR.--."
11 At the 1967 session the U.K. tabled the following text:
". .. Every State has the inalienable right freely to dispose of its
national wealth and natural resources; in the exercise of this right,
due regard shall be paid to the rules of international law and to the
terms of Agreements validly entered into. . . ." L.44, part IV.
This text is identical with a proposal made by Kenya in 1966, except
that the latter proposal included the word "applicable" between "the"
and "rules."
12 L.16.
1
3L.11.
14 L.9.
15 L.16.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3

524/

INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

and on a proposal by the United Arab Republic 16 regarding removal
of foreign military bases.
Finally, the working group reported:
There was no agreement on the desirability of including, in
the present context, a reference to the concept of prohibition
of arbitrary discrimination among Member States of the United
Nations as regards the rights and duties of membership ...
The United States tabled a proposal to this effect at the 1966 session 17
which was viewed by some as a response to the Czech proposal on
the right to join international organizations.
Since the 1967 Special Committee considered this principle
(together with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes) near
the end of its session, after considering the other five principles,
there was not sufficient time to explore the possibilities for conciliating
the remaining differences in the three areas where further agreement
appeared possible.
B. The principle that States shall settle their internationaldisputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that internationalpeace and security
and justice are not endangered
The 1966 Special Committee adopted a text setting out various
points of consensus on this principle.18 That decision resolved a
16 L.9.
17 L.5.
18

The text adopted read as follows:

"1. Every State shall settle its international disputes with other States
by peaceful means, in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered;
"2. States shall accordingly seek early and just settlement of their
international disputes by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their choice. In seeking such a
settlement the parties shall agree upon such peaceful means as may
be appropriate to the circumstances and nature of the dispute;
"3. The parties to a dispute have the duty, in the event of failure
to reach a solution by any one of the above peaceful means, to
continue to seek a settlement of the dispute by other peaceful means
agreed upon by them;
"4. States parties to an international dispute, as well as other States,
shall refrain from any action which may aggravate the situation so as
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, and
shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations;
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3
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number of differences on which there had been a sharp split in views,
such as the Communist contention that "negotiations" should have
a privileged position among the methods of peaceful settlement.
However, the text agreed upon was in some respects more significant
for what it did not say rather than for what it said. For example, no
agreement could be reached on proposals strongly supported by
Western delegations which, inter alia, referred specifically to the
International Court of Justice and recommended that the competent
organs of the United Nations should avail themselves more fully
of their powers in the field of peaceful settlement.1 9 The text might
be also read as favoring ad hoc agreement, which was in line with the
emphasis placed by the Soviet Union on "free choice of means."
The working group established at the 1967 session reported that
it was agreed on the desirability of maintaining the areas of agreement
achieved the previous year, but was unable to register further progress.2" The possibility of obtaining agreement on certain proposals
supported by Western delegations in 1966, and again in 1967,
seemed as remote as ever.
The 1966 Special Committee was seized with a proposal by
Chile 21 stating that, by virtue of Articles 52(4) and 103 of the
United Nations Charter, the right to have recourse to a regional
agency in pursuit of peaceful settlement of a dispute does not preclude or diminish the right of any State to have direct recourse to
the United Nations in defense of its rights. That proposal, with its
obvious implications for the O.A.S., seemed to detract from Article
52(2) of the Charter and to suggest a conflict between the provisions
of the Charter regarding peaceful settlement and the provisions describing the powers and functions of the Security Council and the
right of Member States to have recourse to the Council. The Chilean
representative continued to press the proposal at the 1967 session.

19
20
21

"5. International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the sovereign
equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice
of means. Recourse to, or acceptance of, a settlement procedure
freely agreed.to by the parties shall not be regarded as incompatible
with sovereign equality;
"6. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs prejudices or derogates from
the applicable provisions of the Charter, in particular those relating
to the pacific settlement of international disputes."
L.25 and Add. 1; L.44 (part II).
DC.21 (see 1967 Report, para. 438).
L.26.
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He presented a revised version of the proposal in the working group 22
in an apparent effort to meet the comments of the United States and
other delegations directed at the original proposal. Lack of time
prevented the working group from reaching a conclusion as to the
desirability of including the concept. There may be difficulty in
reaching agreement in the future, if the proposal is viewed as detracting from the balance reflected in Article 52 of the Charter.
C. The duty of States to cooperate with one another in accordance
with the Charter
At the 1966 session the drafting committee came very close
to agreement on the following text: 2
1. States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of their different political, economic and social
systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in
order to maintain international peace and security and to
promote international economic stability and progress and
the general welfare of nations.
2. To this end:
(a) States shall cooperate with other States in the maintenance of international peace and security.
(b)
Alternative A
States shall conduct their international relations in the
economic, social, technical and trade fields in accordance
with 'the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, with a view to ensuring the realization of international
cooperation, free from discrimination based on differences
in political, economic or social systems.
Alternative B
States shall conduct their international relations in the
economic, social, technical and trade fields in accordance
with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, with a view to realizing international cooperation,
free from discrimination based on differences in political,
economic and social systems.
(c) States Members of the United Nations have the duty to
take joint and separate action, in cooperation with the United
Nations, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the
Charter.
22DC.21 (see 1967 Report, para. 438, at 197).
23 See 1966 Report, para. 570.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3
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3. States should cooperate in the economic, social and cultural
fields, as well as in the field of science and technology, and
for the promotion of international, cultural and educational
progress. States should cooperate in the promotion of
economic growth throughout the world, especially that of
the developing countries.
The only remaining difficulty lay in paragraph 2(b), which
dealt with "discrimination." The United States and a number of
countries preferred Alternative B, but others preferred the first alternative; still others stressed that the difference was a matter of mere
semantics. At the heart of this issue was the Communist hostility
to Western trading patterns and relationships which they viewed as
discriminatory. The Eastern Europeans indicated their strong desire
for most-favored-nation treatment in economic matters, in contending
that States are obliged to refrain from any discrimination in their
relations with other States, particularly "discrimination by reason of
differences in political, economic and social systems. . .

."

Western

representatives were willing to participate in the search for generally
acceptable language, provided that the text would not imply it was
illegal for a State to draw certain distinctions between other States.
A rigid formulation of the concept of non-discrimination could condemn the trade policies of many States, notably with respect to agreements embodying exchanges of concessions. -4
An important lacuna in the 1966 text was the absence of any
reference to cooperation in the field of human rights-particularly
as the requirement for such cooperation figures prominently in Article
55 of the Charter.
The two issues noted above-non-discrimination and human
rights-were settled in the drafting committee at the 1967 session.22
The first issue was settled by inserting a reference to non-discrimination in paragraph1, which was modified to read:
States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective
of the differences in their political, economic, and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in order
to maintain international peace and security and to promote
international economic stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and international cooperation free from discriminationbased on such differences.2 13 (Emphasis added.)
24
2
26

See, e.g., Bailey (Australia), SR.58, at 19; Reis (U.S.), id. at 20.
See DC.20, 1967 Report, para. 161, at 83.
Para. 2(c) (Formerly para. 2(b) ) now reads:

International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3
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Optically, this formulation seems more favorable to the Western
view than either Alternative A or B of paragraph 2(b) in the 1966
text, for the goal of non-discrimination is no longer linked narrowly
to "international relations in the economic, social, technical and trade
fields." More significantly, "international cooperation free from discrimination based on [differences in political, economic and social
systems]" appears to be merely a generalized goal, on a par with
"international economic stability and progress [and] the general welfare of nations."
The question of a reference to cooperation in the field of
human rights was resolved by agreement on the following text:
. . . 2(b). States shall cooperate in the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and in the elimination of all forms of
racial discrimination and all forms of religious intolerance.
This text emerged as a compromise between various Western
proposals based on Article 55 of the Charter and insistence by
certain others on the need to refer to cooperation to eliminate
apartheid, all forms of racial discrimination, and colonialism. The
compromise formula is somewhat cumbersome, but it is clear from
the record that it was not intended as a departure from Article 55.;
the principle would be applied without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. -7
In almost all other respects, the 1966 formulations were not
changed at the 1967 session of the Special Committee. The consensus text which thus emerged is a modest one, but a certain degree
of "progressive development" of the law is apparent. Various Western
States, including the United States, had originally taken the view
that cooperation was not a binding legal duty recognized in customary
international law, and they had noted that international cooperation
was not listed among the principles set forth in Article 2 of the
Charter. 8 Under that view, "the duty of States to cooperate with one
another in accordance with the Charter" should be formulated as
applicable to United Nations Members only. They no longer insisted
on this at the 1967 session.
"States shall conduct their international relations in the economic,
social, cultural, technical and trade fields in accordance with the
principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention."
27 1967 Report, paras. 162, 164, 166; cf., para. 168.
28 See, e.g., Miller (Canada), SR. 55, at 3.
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D. The principle that States shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the Charter
The following consensus text was adopted by the drafting committee at the 1967 session:
1. Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by it in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
2. Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of
international law.
3. Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under international agreements valid under the generally
recognized principles and rules of international law.
4. Where obligations arising under international agreements
are in conflict with the obligations of members of the United
Nations under the Charter of the United
Nations, the obliga29
tions under the Charter shall prevail.

This text is a modest one, reflecting the minimum obtainable in the
light of deep division on certain issues.
The first paragraph merely reflects Article 2(2) of the Charter.
Paragraphs 2 and 3 confirm that the principle of good faith is not
confined to Charter obligations but also applies to treaties and obligations arising from other sources of international law. These paragraphs do not reflect acceptance of the thesis of Communist and certain developing countries, that only treaties "freely concluded on a
basis of equality" are binding-although certain delegations sought
to interpret the reference in paragraph 3 to "the generally recognized
principles and rules of international law" as embodying that thesis."
Western delegations rejected this contention."' The comments of
certain Afro-Asian representatives, to the effect that paragraph 3
should be revised expressly to provide that treaties must be freely
concluded on the basis of equality, tend to support the Western
interpretation of paragraph 3.11
The fourth paragraph of the consensus text, based on Article 103
of the Charter, derives from a United States proposal made at the
1966 session 11 and was proposed by the United Kingdom at the
1967 Report, para. 785.
30 Id., paras. 288, 290, 292, 297.
20

31

Id., paras. 287, 291.

Id., paras. 289, 293-95, 298-99.
3 L.37.
32
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1967 session " as part of a comprehensive declaration on all seven
principles. Several proposals on this question were couched in terms
of the "validity" of treaties in conflict with the Charter. 5 These
proposals were not acceptable to Western representatives, who were
hesitant to enter into such detail in the area of conflict of treaty.
obligations with the Charter, particularly in view of the forthcoming
Conference on the Law of TreatiesSs5
E. The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorialintegrity or
political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations
As in 1966, the Special Committee was unable to achieve consensus on this principle at its 1967 session. Again, there were two
broad divisions of opinion. Some States, including the United States,
felt that the Special Committee should begin where the work at
Mexico City had left off,"6 while others, following the lead of
Czechoslovakia, sought to begin anew.
34L.44, part VII. Arguably, Para. 4 of the consensus text is broader in
scope than Article 103 of the Charter, if the "obligations arising under international agreements" to which it refers are not necessarily those of States Members
of the U.N.
35

L.35 and L.48.

Ha Regrettably, no agreement was reached on including a provision to the
effect that obligations under international law may not be lawfully avoided by
reason of national law or national policy. Both the U.S. and U.K. texts contained such a provision.
86 The near-consensus Mexico City text provided:
"1. Every State has the duty to refrain in its international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
"2. In accordance with the foregoing fundamental principle, and without limiting its generality:

"(a) Wars of aggression constitute international crimes against
peace.
"(b) Every State has the dutv to refrain from organizing or
encouraging the organization of irregular or volunteer forces or
armed bands within its territory or any other territory for incursions into the territory of another State.
"(c) Every State has the duty to refrain from instigating, assisting, or organizing civil strife or committing terrorist acts in
another State, or from conniving at or acquiescing in organized
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3
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In 1966 the drafting committee was only able to reach provisional agreement on two points, the first a restatement of Article
2(4) of the Charter, the second a provision that "wars of aggression
constitute international crimes against peace for which there is responsibility under international law." It was divided on such issues as:
(1) whether formulations of the duty to refrain from the threat or use
of force should refer to "international lines of demarcation," as proposed by Western delegations; " (2) whether to include under this
activities directed towards such ends, when such acts involve a
threat or use of force.
"(d) Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use
of force to violate the existing boundaries of another State, or as
a means of solving its international disputes, including territorial
disputes and problems concerning frontiers between States.
"3. Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs affects the provisions of the
Charter concerning the lawful use of force."
37L.22 (Joint proposal by Australia, Canada, and the U.S.); L.44, part I
(U.K.). Significantly, the text proposed by five Latin American countries
of the 1967 session of the Special Committee (L.49/Rev. 1) also includes a
reference to "international lines of demarcation." At the 1967 session the
U.S. Representative, Herbert Reis, explained the importance of the reference
and made a special effort to disabuse Arab countries of fears that the reference might somehow compromise their position on the Middle East crisis:
"Most of the threats to peace and most of the peace-keeping situations with
which the United Nations had dealt had been in connection with international
lines of demarcation. Recent events appeared to make that analysis all the
more valid and the inclusion of that notion all the more urgent. The legal
nature of such lines and their legal implications differed from one to another.
For that reason, inter alia, the [U.S.] text took no position on the justice of
those lines of demarcation and in no way affected the legal status of the territories they circumscribed or divided.
"However, such lines did not exist unless established in accordance with
international law and the Charter. A line established by the fiat of an aggressor,
for example, was nothing more than that and had no standing in international
law. The question of the prohibition of the use of force across such lines was
unrelated to the question of their duration, which would vary from case to
case depending upon the terms and methods of their creation, and as with
acknowledged boundaries, the prohibition lasted no longer than the lines
themselves. Their creation, indeed, was often for the purpose .of terminating
the use of force and permitting the methods of peaceful settlement envisaged
by the Charter to operate. Since such lines existed, his delegation firmly
believed that the use of force across them was gravely disruptive to the principles of the Charter." SR. 62, at 13-14.
Ian Sinclair, the U.K. representative, said that:
"His delegation understood the expression (international lines of demarcation) to denote lines resulting from armistice agreements or other agreements
for the cessation of hostilities which carried no implication as to the territories
divided by such lines. It did not consider that cease-fire positions as such
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3
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principle or under the principle on non-intervention 38 formulations
on the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular or volunteer forces or armed bands for incursion
into another State's territory and to refrain from armed reprisal
or attack, and on the duty to refrain from involvement in civil strife
and terrorist acts in another State; (3) whether the Charter principle
of non-use of force applies only to "armed force," as Western delegations insisted, or whether it includes economic, political, and other
forms of pressure, as most other delegations contended; 38 (4) whether
to include a provision on war propaganda; (5) whether to prohibit
all forms of military occupation and to provide for the non-recognition of situations brought about by the illegal use of force; (6)
whether to sanction "wars of liberation," by prohibiting "armed
actions or repressive measures of any kind directed against peoples
struggling against colonialism," and excepting from the scope of this
principle the use of force in "self-defense of peoples against colonial
domination in the exercise of the right of self-determination"; 40
(7) how to provide for legal uses of force. 1
The 1967 Special Committee was faced with the same issues,
and labored under the added burden of a highly charged atmosphere
clouded by the situation in Vietnam and the Middle East. Although
the working group that considered the principle at the 1967 session
made measurable progress " beyond that achieved in 1966, most of
could constitute an international line of demarcation as the expression was
used in its proposal, although there did remain an obligation upon the States
which had accepted cease-fire arrangements to maintain those arrangements
pending negotiations for a settlement and to abide by any directives of the
Security Council in that connexion." SR. 65, at 6.
38 Communist delegations preferred the latter approach.
39 The Latin American proposal in L. 49/Rev. 1,supra, n. 37, appeared to
share the restrictive interpretation favored by Western delegations.
40 See proposal by Czechoslovakia in L. 16.
41 Not unexpectedly, a basic issue here was whether to refer merely to the
Security Council, as proposed by Czechoslovakia, or whether to refer to "a
competent United Nations organ," as proposed by other delegations. Other
familiar unresolved issues were: (1) whether to include a reference to the
lawful use of force by a regional agency acting in accordance with the
Charter; and (2) whether to limit the lawful use of force in self-defense to
cases of "armed attack."
42 Its report is contained in DC.17, which appears in para. 107 of the 1967
Report. The working group agreed in principle that every State has the duty
to refrain from the. threat or use of force to violate the boundaries of another
State or as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers between States. (It could not agree
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3
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the difficult issues remain unresolved."2 a There is, nonetheless, some
ground for optimism regarding the possibility of reaching consensus
at a subsequent session of the Special Committee, particularly if the
Special Committee can begin building upon the foundation of the
Mexico City text. However, it may be too late for the latter approach
to be acceptable to all sides.
on a reference to international lines of demarcation in this connection.) It
agreed that every State has the duty to refrain from acts of armed reprisal, but
agreement was not reached on whether a statement to this effect should refer
as well to acts of this nature not involving the use of armed force. There was
agreement in principle that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing
or encouraging the organization of irregular or volunteer forces for incursion
into the territory of another State, and to refrain from involvement in civil
strife and terrorist acts in another State; however, agreement was not reached
as to whether statements on these matters should be included under the principle concerning the threat or use of force or under the principle of non-intervention. The working group agreed on the inclusion of the concept of general
and complete disarmament under effective international control as a corollary
to the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force. There was
also agreement to include in that statement a reference to measures to reduce
international tensions and strengtren confidence among States. Finally, there
was agreement in principle on the desirability of making the United Nations
security system more effective-although there was some opposition to including
a statement to this effect.
42a Western delegations have insisted on confining the term "force" to "armed
force," since Article 2(4) of the Charter relates only to armed force. They
consider that economic, political, or other forms of pressures not constituting
"armed force" can be adequately accounted for under the principle of nonintervention, but this view may not be shared by others.
The question of prohibiting "war propaganda" is particularly troubling for
the United States and countries with similar concerns for freedom of expression. The United States has consistently stressed the difficulty of drafting a
well-circumscribed text dealing with "war propaganda" in this context. In
an effort to meet the views of other delegations at the 1967 session of the
Special Committee, Italy and the Netherlands proposed that Members of the
United Nations "should favor the free exchange of information and ideas
essential to international understanding and peace, and take appropriate steps
to discourage propaganda against peace," in the light of General Assembly
resolutions on the subject (L.51 and Corr. 1). The Latin American text went
further; it would "prohibit, in the light of each country's constitutional system,
any propaganda" encouraging wars of aggression (L.49/Rev. 1). At the opposite extreme were (i) a Czech proposal to prohibit "any propaganda for
war, incitement to or fomenting of war, and any propaganda for preventive
war and for striking the first nuclear blow" (L.16) and (ii) a non-aligned
proposal to prohibit "any propaganda which encourages the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another
State" (L.48).
Proposals seeking to prohibit all forms of military occupation present special
drafting problems, particularly in the light of the legal status of Berlin.
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F. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
The discussion of the principles at the 1967 session reflected
the same themes as the previous year, and the drafting committee
concluded that the areas of agreement recorded in the working
group's report were not sufficient to justify transmitting the report
to the Special Committee. 3
The working group reported that it was agreed that the principle is of a universal character and, as such, applicable to all peoples.
However, no agreement was reached either on how to identify the
"peoples" concerned or on whether the universal character of the
principle should be explicitly incorporated in the text or left to
emerge by implication from the text ultimately to be agreed upon.
Thus, there was no agreement upon the manner in which the general
statement of the principle should be formulated. 4
The fact that there was agreement on the universal character
of the principle is noteworthy. This principle was included in Article
2(1) of the Charter at the insistence of the Soviet Union. Although
it is couched in terms of general application, the Soviet Union in
the past has sought to confine it to colonial contexts, and many
developing countries have been sympathetic to emphasizing colonial
situations.
At the 1967 session the United Kingdom tabled a text on
this principle that sought to establish criteria for determining the
applicability of the principle and its implementation in order to give
meaning to the concept of self-determination as a universal concern."
The United Kingdom text, largely based on a United States initiative
at the .1966 session of the Special Committee, 6 was cast in terms of
the duty of every State to "respect" the principle and to implement
it with regard to the peoples within its jurisdiction. Other proposals,
by Czechoslovakia " and non-aligned countries, 8 were cast in terms
of the "right" of all peoples to self-determination. Although Western
Finally, Communist delegations have made no progress in their effort, under
various guises, to obtain Special Committee approval for "wars of liberation."
This is one of the most sensitive areas of the Special Committee's work, and
agreement will obviously be possible only if this Communist goal is abandoned.
43 1967 Report, para. 231.
44 D.C.19.
4, L.44, part VI.
46 L.32.
41 L.16, part VI.
48

L.48.
International Lawyer, Vol. 2, No. 3

United Nations Affairs

/535

delegations did not insist upon the view held by many, that the
principle reflects a moral or political postulate rather than a settled
rule of international law, they opposed formulations of the principle
in terms of the "right of all peoples" because of the almost insuperable
difficulty of determining the content of "all peoples."
The Czech text was a strictly "anti-colonial" one which sought
to outlaw colonialism as contrary to the Charter, sanction the "inalienable right" of peoples to carry out wars of liberation, and prohibit
"any armed action or repressive measures of any kind against peoples
under colonial rule." In a somewhat similar vein, the non-aligned text
sought to establish an obligation of States to "render assistance to
the United Nations in carrying out its responsibilities to bring an
immediate end to colonialism . . ." and the right of "peoples who
are deprived of their legitimate right of self-determination and complete freedom . . . to exercise their inherent right of self-defense,
by virtue of which they may receive assistance from other States."
Here again, there was an effort by non-aligned delegations to justify
positions by reference to certain resolutions of the General Assembly
as authoritative guidance in formulating the legal content of the
principle-in this case, resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People,
and resolution 2160 (XXI) entitled "Strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of
the right of peoples to self-determination."
Of particular concern to a number of delegations was the need
to reconcile the principle of self-determination of "peoples" with the
sovereignty of the States in which they live. The United Kingdom
text contained the following provision dealing with this issue:
4. States enjoying full sovereignty and independence, and
possessed of a representative government, effectively functioning as such to all distinct peoples within their territory,
in conshould be considered to be conducting themselves
49
formity with this principle as regards those peoples.
49 A related aspect of this issue concerns the obligation of other States.
The working group at the 1967 session formulated the following text:

"Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total
disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other

[country/ State]."
The workii g group failed to reach agreement on a choice between the bracketed
words.
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The Western position on self-determination, as reflected in
the United Kingdom text, is admirably forthright, and one that can
be defended with pride. Its essential features need not be abandoned
in the search for consensus-particularly in light of the propagandistic
tone of other proposals that do not meaningfully come to grips with
the underlying issues involved.
G. The principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the
Charter
The 1966 session of the Special Committee revealed wide and
unreconciled differences on the principle of non-intervention, both
on the substantive issues involved and on the relevance to the work
of the Special Committee of General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX)
("Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty"). This resolution was adopted by the Assembly in
1965 by a vote of 109 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.K.). The U.S. and
other Western countries considered that while resolution 2131 was
an important milestone in the Assembly's efforts to formulate political
standards of conduct, it was not intended as a statement by law.5"
However, Communist, non-aligned, and Latin American countries
supported the proposition that resolution 2131,
by virtue of the number of States which voted in its favor, the
scope and profundity of its contents and, in particular, the absence of opposition reflects a universal legal conviction which
qualifies it to be regarded as an authentic and definite principle of international law."1
In the view of the latter, the Special Committee should have recommended to the General Assembly that it incorporate the provisions
of resolution 2131 as the text on non-intervention; they felt that
the Special Committee should, at most, have considered only purely
drafting changes in the resolution, as well as proposals for adding
to it. After considerable discussion of this issue the 1966 Special
Committee adopted, by a vote of 22 to 8 (U.S.), with 1 abstention
(Sweden), a resolution in which it decided to "abide by" resolution
50 See, e.g., General Assembly, Official Records, 20th session, Dec. 21, 1965
(plenary).
51 The quoted language is from a resolution adopted by the 1966 Special
Committee. See 1966 Report, para. 336. See also, infra, n. 55, and accompanying text.
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2131 and instructed the drafting committee to direct its work "towards
the consideration of additional proposals, with the aim of widening
the area of agreement" of that resolution. " Bound by such instructions, the drafting committee was unable to achieve a consensus
text. Its chairman, Paul Engo (Cameroon), reported that "an
embarrassing lack of agreement" had been encountered at every turn,
although "the exercise in which the drafting committee had engaged
had been useful in its own way." "
In its instructions to the 1967 Special Committee, in resolution
2181 (XXI), the General Assembly asked it "to consider proposals . . . with the aim of widening the area of agreement already
expressed in General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX)." This instruction apeared to give the Special Committee a broader mandate
with respect to resolution 2131 than the Special Committee had
assumed for itself at the 1966 session; the Assembly did not ask
it to "abide by" that resolution. However, in another paragraph
of resolution 2181 the Assembly took "note" of the above-mentioned
decision of the 1966 Special Committee. This paved the way for
controversy at the 1967 session of the Special Committee over the
meaning of its mandate. Predictably, this happened and the working group established at the 1967 session to consider non-intervention was unable to report on the principle.
On the last day of the session the drafting committee reported
to the Special Committee on all seven principles, including a report
on the lack of progress on non-intervention.5" The U.S.S.R. and
twelve other delegations, including all of the Latin American countries, then proposed that the Special Committee decide to include
the operative paragraphs of resolution 2131 in the formulation of
the non-intervention principle. 5 Western delegations countered by
reserving their positions on the consensus texts proposed by the
drafting committee until a decision was taken on the thirteen-power
proposal. The West may have reasoned that there was scant value
in a painstaking search for consensus on six of seven principles in
a declaration, if a text on the seventh adopted by majority vote over
the strong objection of an important number of States. The thirteen
52 See 1966 Report, para. 340.
5

Ibid., para. 354.

54 See

1967 Report, para. 365.

55L.54.

This proposal began by "recalling" the 1966 resolution of the

Special Committee, and in particular the position of that resolution quoted
at the text to note 51.
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powers finally did not press their proposal to a vote, and a convenient face-saving device was found: the Special Committee would
merely "take note of all the drafting committee's reports and transmit them to the General Assembly." 5" Thus, the Special Committee
did not formally approve of the reports submitted to it, or the consensus texts agreed upon by the drafting committee at its 1967
session.
Substantively, the gulf between opposing positions on nonintervention does not appear unbridgeable. Most, if not all, of the
apparent difference between the 1967 United Kingdom proposal
and resolution 2131 disappear on closer examination. The omitted
portions of resolution 2131 are reflected elsewhere in the United
Kingdom declaration, with some exceptions. For example, resolution 2131 refers to non-intervention in the "internal or external affairs of any other State." The Western view, reflected in the United
Kingdom text, is that the term "internal affairs" is adequate. Western delegations opposed the reference to "external affairs" as obscure,
ambiguous, and, in any case, superfluous. 7 They wished to avoid
any implication that acts of normal diplomatic intercourse, involving
conciliation and persuasion, were to be condemned as "intervention."
Another difference is that resolution 2131 provides that no State
is to "interfere in civil strife in another State"; the United Kingdom
text provides that the "encouragement of civil war" is illegal-thus
taking into account situations in which a Government in difficulty
seeks and receives assistance from a friendly State to preserve or
restore internal law and order. The United Kingdom text also seeks
to correct imprecision in the formulation in resolution 2131 of
intervention through "coercion." " On balance, the United Kingdom
51See 1967 Report, para. 474.
.7

See, e.g., Sinclair (U.K.), SR. 57, at 5-6.

-1 Resolution 2131 provides that:

"2. No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain
from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to
secure from it advantages of any kind ..
"
The U.S. representative noted the difficulty with such language:
"[A] strict legal interpretation of the sentence and its application to
certain specific conditions could make the normal and customary
diplomatic intercourse between States impossible. For example, if
State A informed State B that any capital investment it might make
in a development programme in State B would depend upon the
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formulation is a forthright attempt to meet the concerns of those
who seek to include the text of resolution 2131 in haec verba.
Unlike the 1966 text co-sponsored by the United States, the United
Kingdom and other Western States, 9 the 1967 United Kingdom
text does not mention, in the context of non-intervention: the individual or collective right of self-defense against intervention or the
freedom of States to seek to influence the policies and actions of
other States. United States support for the United Kingdom text
indicates that the U.S. Government has demonstrated an admirable
degree of flexibility in the light of its 1964 position at Mexico City,
where it stressed the view that, apart from Article 2(4) (threat or
use of force), the Charter does not deal separately and expressly
with intervention by States.
III. Future of the Special Committee
The General Assembly considered the report of the 1967 Special Committee at its 22nd session and adopted a resolution "
recommended by the Sixth Committee under which the Special
Committee would meet in 1968 (1) to complete the formulation
latter's acceptance of a bilateral or multilateral investment agreement,
that statement could well be considered as falling within the type of
activities prohibited by paragraph 2 of resolution 2131 (XX), as it
was worded. Such a result had assuredly not been intended." SR.72,
at 6.
L.13.
o See U.N.G.A. Res 2327 (XXII). The Assembly adopted this resolution
by a vote of 84 to 0, with 17 abstentions. All of the abstentions were cast
by Western countries. Only two Western members of the Special Committee
supported the resolution-Canada and France. The paragraph on the Special
Committee's mandate with regard to non-intervention was included by a vote
of 77 to 14 (U.S.), with 8 abstentions. In the Sixth Committee the U.S. had
proposed a resolution under which the Special Committee (1) would take up
as a matter of priority the principles on nonuse of force and equal rights and
self-determination of peoples; (2) would complete non-intervention if time
permitted; and (3) would examine additional proposals on the four other
principles after completing its work on the three principles noted above.
The U.S. proposal was not put to a vote. See U.N. Doc. A/6955, Dec. 11,
1967, Agenda item 87, Report of the Sixth Committee, paragraphs 19, 124.
The Assembly's suggestion that the members of the Special Committee engage
in advance consultations or other preparatory measures reflects the view that
the Special Committee is handicapped in carrying out its work because of the
breadth of its mandate and serious time limitations. See, e.g., 1967 Report,
paras. 481-82, and U.N. Doc. A/6955, supra, paras. 111-16. It is anticipated
that the Special Committee will meet in New York for three to four weeks
in September, 1968. U.N. Doc. A/6799, supra, para. 21.
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of the principles of non-use of force and equal rights and self
determination of peoples and (2) to consider proposals "compatible with" resolution 2131, on non-intervention, "with the aim
of widening the area of agreement already expressed in that resolution." The Assembly resolution also called upon members of the
Special Committee:
to devote their utmost efforts to ensuring the success of the
Special Committee's session, in particular by undertaking, in
the period preceding the session, such consultations and other
preparatory measures as they may deem necessary.
A signal omission from this mandate for the 1968 Special Committee is a reference to any of the other four principles, for which
consensus texts have emerged at prior sessions of the Special
Committee.
Much of the discussion in the Sixth Committee revolved around
the issue of the future work of the Special Committee. Many delegations, including the United States, considered that the progress
made by the Special Committee in 1967, although limited, was
laudable-particularly in view of the difficulty of the task and the
prevailing political climate. Some of those who stressed the failures
of the Special Committee also criticized its procedures, arguing that
there was an over-emphasis on consensus.
Although it was generally agreed that the Special Committee
should meet again, there was disagreement as to its mandate. The
Assembly's decision reflects the view of most delegations, that the
Special Committee should concentrate on those principles on which
there had been no consensus texts, particularly non-use of force and
equal rights and self-determination of peoples. However, with regard
to non-intervention, the Assembly was divided and may have taken
a more rigid stance than at its 21st session. The requirement that
proposals must be "compatible with" resolution 2131 could impede
the future work of the Special Committee, if it wastes valuable time
in fruitless debate over its mandate rather than in the search for
an acceptable text. There was, however, some indication at the
Assembly session of a more flexible approach in the future by supporters of resolution 2131. For example, Mexico indicated that
it would be prepared to enter into negotiations on "wording which
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would not do violence to its fundamental position ....
, 61 In
any case, the decision of the General Assembly in this regard does
not augur well for the work of the Special Committee on nonintervention.
It is difficult to predict the prospects for achieving agreement
on a declaration covering all seven principles. Major differences
remain on three principles, and there is also the problem of fitting
the separate texts on various principles into a single declaration.
A suggestion advanced by some delegations was that if a declaration
on all seven principles is unobtainable, separate declarations might
be adopted on agreed principles. It is premature to say whether
such a course will prove necessary.
As for the position of Western countries, it would seem
undesirable for them to adhere too rigidly to the conviction that in
creating international law in this field one must not venture beyond
the boundaries of the Charter." However, it is quite another matter to sacrifice certain principles and high standards of rigorous
analysis merely out of fear that the Communists and some newer
States may succeed in depicting the Western notion of international
law as serving only an imperialist cause, and persuade the community of developing countries to reject time-honored rules of international law. The West can and should continue to follow the path
of common sense and good will which it traced at the 1967 session
of the Special Committee. Ultimately, it may be unable to avoid
a situation in which a declaration (or declarations) is pressed to
the vote and adopted by a majority, with the West dissenting. However, that possibility is still in the distance. Indeed, it is becoming
increasingly apparent that the Communist countries have begun
to realize that the West was right in insisting on the consensus
approach-notwithstanding certain statements by Communist delegations to the contrary. It is doubtful whether the USSR would now
find it desirable to seek a declaration or declarations adopted by a
divisive majority, especially since it has already failed to attain its
first major objective-to codify "peaceful coexistence."
01 U.N. Doc. A/C 6/SR. 998, at 11. The Pakistani delegate rightly observed
that resolution 2131 was not "a legal document in the strict sense of the
term." Therefore, he argued that the Special Committee "should formulate
the principle in legal terms after giving due consideration to the area of agreement already expressed in resolution 2131."
62 See Houben, supra, n. 2, at 734.
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The "friendly relations" exercise, although ostensibly a legal
one, is inextricably linked to the realities of international policies.
The fact that the Special Committee is composed of representatives
of States, rather than of independent experts as in the International Law
Commission, underscores the political significance of its work.
Whatever its shortcomings, the Special Committee may register a
significant achievement by providing a current statement of the
manner in which the States Members of the United Nations are
willing to respect certain basic principles of the Charter.
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